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Background: According to the threshold model, when faced with a decision under diagnostic uncertainty,
physicians should administer treatment if the probability of disease is above a specified threshold and withhold
treatment otherwise. The objectives of the present study are to a) evaluate if physicians act according to a
threshold model, b) examine which of the existing threshold models [expected utility theory model (EUT),
regret-based threshold model, or dual-processing theory] explains the physicians’ decision-making best.
Methods: A survey employing realistic clinical treatment vignettes for patients with pulmonary embolism and
acute myeloid leukemia was administered to forty-one practicing physicians across different medical specialties.
Participants were randomly assigned to the order of presentation of the case vignettes and re-randomized to the
order of “high” versus “low” threshold case. The main outcome measure was the proportion of physicians who
would or would not prescribe treatment in relation to perceived changes in threshold probability.
Results: Fewer physicians choose to treat as the benefit/harms ratio decreased (i.e. the threshold increased) and
more physicians administered treatment as the benefit/harms ratio increased (and the threshold decreased). When
compared to the actual treatment recommendations, we found that the regret model was marginally superior to
the EUT model [Odds ratio (OR) = 1.49; 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.00 to 2.23; p = 0.056]. The dual-processing
model was statistically significantly superior to both EUT model [OR = 1.75, 95% CI 1.67 to 4.08; p < 0.001] and regret
model [OR = 2.61, 95% CI 1.11 to 2.77; p = 0.018].
Conclusions: We provide the first empirical evidence that physicians’ decision-making can be explained by the
threshold model. Of the threshold models tested, the dual-processing theory of decision-making provides the best
explanation for the observed empirical results.
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Medical decision-making is often performed under con-
ditions of diagnostic uncertainty; that is, physicians fre-
quently need to decide whether to give treatment to a
patient who may or may not have a disease. Clinical
practice is full of these examples. For instance, if the
physician treating a patient with a sore throat estimates
that the probability of streptococcal infection is suffi-
ciently high, she may decide to treat – assuming that the* Correspondence: bdjulbeg@health.usf.edu
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumbenefits of administering antibiotic outweigh its poten-
tial harms. Thus, to make appropriate therapeutic deci-
sion when a diagnosis is uncertain, the clinician has to:
1) ascertain the probability of a patient having the dis-
ease, and 2) decide whether the potential treatment ben-
efits will outweigh its harms.
In everyday clinical practice, the assessment of the
likelihood of disease and balance of treatment’s benefits
and harms is often done intuitively, but this decision-
making process can be formalized under the “threshold
model” [1,2]. According to the threshold model, when
faced with uncertainty about whether to treat a patient
who may or may not have a disease, there must exist
some probability at which a physician is indifferentntral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited.
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this is known as threshold probability [1,2]. Physicians
would choose to treat when the probability of disease
is above the threshold probability and would choose to
withhold treatment otherwise [1,2]. The threshold model
stipulates that as the therapeutic benefit/harms ratio
increases, the threshold probability at which treatment
is justified is lowered. Conversely, if the treatment’s
benefit/harms ratio decreases, the required threshold
for therapeutic action will be higher. To date, three
types of threshold models have been described: 1) the
original model, based on the expected utility theory (EUT)
framework (TEUT) [1,2]; 2) the regret-based threshold
model (TRG) [3-5]; and 3) the threshold model based on
the dual-processing theory of decision-making (TDP) [6].
The TEUT model is derived from the principles of deci-
sion theory, which hold that a decision-maker should select
the option with the highest expected utility to maximize
achievement of valued outcomes. The TRG model is based
on expected regret theory, which holds that the preferred
course of action is based on the least amount of regret asso-
ciated with a possibly wrong decision. The TDP model is
based on dual processing theories, which postulate that our
cognition is governed by so called type 1 or 2 processes
[7-15]. Type 1 processes are intuitive, automatic, fast, narra-
tive, experiential and affect-based; type 2 processes are ana-
lytical, slow, verbal, and deliberative supporting formal
logical and probabilistic analyses [7-16].
Despite the widespread popularity, none of the threshold
models (TEUT, TRG, TDP) have been submitted to empirical
evaluation to test their descriptive accuracy. The purpose of
our study was to assess whether physicians act according
to a threshold model, and if they do, to determine which
model best explains their decision-making. Knowing if
physicians operate under a threshold model and which
model best describes physicians’ decisions is very import-
ant for medical education as it can help identify the most
salient features of medical decision-making. This, in turn
can be used for didactic purposes towards better practice
of clinical decision-making. In addition, understanding the
decision-making processes can help explain patterns ob-
served in the contemporary clinical practice such as treat-
ment overuse and underuse.
Methods
Participants and setting
Physicians from the University of South Florida and
Evidence-based Medicine Discussion Group were recruited
for the study via email invitation to participate in a web-
based survey. E-mail invitations were sent via institutional
listserv followed by a weekly reminder. No incentives were
offered for participation in the study. The only inclusion
criteria were that participants were practicing physicians,
regardless of the field of medicine, actively involved intherapeutic decision-making on a daily basis. The sur-
vey was closed after the target sample was reached. The
study was approved by the USF IRB (No. Pro9047).
Design and materials
All theories of decision-making agree that choices are
functions of benefits (gains) and harms (losses). Therefore,
we constructed the case vignettes to allow easy discernment
of benefits and harms for serious, life-threatening out-
comes. The aim was to compel our study participants to
rely on the estimates of benefits and harms, in particular
on the benefit/harm (B/H) ratio. To minimize “framing
effect” [17], we chose presentation and wording that is
commonly used in the literature and medical commu-
nication and with which most physicians are familiar.
Threshold models
Our case vignettes refer to a clinical situation when a
decision about treatment has to be made but a physician
is uncertain whether the patient has a given condition
and no further diagnostic tests are available to her/him
to reduce the diagnostic or prognostic uncertainty. We
now provide a brief outline of all 3 models:
1) Expected utility threshold model
Although often considered gold standard of rationality,
violation of decision-making by EUT is well documented
in literature [5,18-21]. However, one issue is rarely directly
addressed: do people violate precepts of EUT because of er-
rors due to brain processing limitations, or because EUT
does not reflect the optimal decision-making perspective of
the decision-maker. For example, few people can accurately
multiply 3.4578*4,678; that does not, however, mean they
reject (normatively) the correct answer once they perform
the calculation with help of a calculator. Most people sim-
ply correct their error and accept the answer obtained after
punching the numbers into a calculator. We, therefore,
asked the following question: will people behave according
to EUT after they are told what they should (normatively)
do? Or, will they violate the rules of EUT even after they
are told what is the theoretical best course of action?
For this purpose, we included a number of prescriptive
statements in our case vignettes based on the EUT nor-
mative calculations.
The EUT threshold was calculated as:
TEUT ¼ 1= 1þ B2H2
 
ð1Þ
where benefits/harms (B2/H2) refer to the objective data
obtained from the literature. Thus, if B2/H2 = 9, the
probability above which we should give treatment is only
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we used the subscript 2 in equation 1].
2) Regret threshold model
Many clinical decisions are driven by regret where a
decision-maker (a doctor or a patient) seeks to minimize
regret associated with a potentially wrong decision [3-5].
In general, in a clinical situation similar to the one
considered here, a decision maker deals with two types
of regret: failure to provide benefit (regret of omission)
versus administering unnecessary and potentially harmful
treatment (regret of commission) [3-5]. Given that in
medical decision-making most decisions cannot be reversed
(e.g., once surgery has occurred, its effects cannot be
reversed), the TRG model is based on anticipatory regret
only [3-5]) (as opposed to retrospective regret or post-
decision justification regret [22,23]). Anticipation of
regret leads to more vigilant decision making, satisfying
most of the criteria of high-quality decisions [8,24]. To
estimate regret of omission versus commission, as alluded
above, we employed the regret-based Dual Visual Analog
Scale (DVAS) [25] (see Figure 1 and Additional file 1 for
further details on actual regret elicitation). Regret thresh-
old was calculated by employing the following formula:
TREG ¼ 1= 1þ B1H1
 
ð2Þ
where B1/H1 is failure to benefit/unnecessary harms. Note
the regret threshold model is, psychologically, a type 1 only
model, which relies on holistic assessment of benefits and
harms (hence, we used subscript 1 in the equation). That is,
the model predicts that the responses will be determined
by regret, which is an affective (and hence type 1) response.
3) Dual-processing threshold model
In recent years, it has become evident that decision-
making theories which assume a single system of reason-
ing are not sufficient to explain human decision-making
[8,9,26-28]. Instead, as introduced above, it is increasingly
accepted that cognitive processes are governed by both type
1 and type 2 processes [8,9,26-28]. We recently developed a
threshold model based on dual processing theory (TDP),
which takes into account analytical type 2 functioning
based on rational calculus of EUT as well as type 1
mechanisms driven both by emotion (regret) and other
type 1 processes [6].
The decision to administer treatment according to type
2 processing depends on the EUT threshold calculated
as shown in equation 1. The extent of type 1 processes
(i.e., the extent to which type 1 processes are not sup-
pressed by or compete with type 2 processes) in thedecision-making is given by parameter γ [0 to 1]; if γ = 0,
then decision-making adheres to EUT. Conversely, if γ = 1,
then type 1 processes dominate decision-making. For any
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, decision-making is a combination of both pro-
cesses. The formula for calculation of the TDP, is given by:









As explained, B1 and H1 are elicited from the participants
(Figure 1) while TEUT is calculated based on the best evi-
dence from the literature, B2 and H2. Because γ represents
the extent of activation of type 1 processes, this can be con-
ceptualized as relative distance between analytically derived
TEUT and regret-based, TREG. Thus, we calculated γ in the











Therefore, γ is equal to TEUT−TRGTEUT , if
TEUT−TRG
TEUT
< 1 . If
TEUT−TRG
TEUT
≥1 , then γ is equal to 1. Estimates for γ are
provided in Additional file 2, Table S1.
Note that there are many dual-processing theories
[29] and the model presented here represents a specific
dual-processing model that is applicable to single-point
clinical decisions [6].
A survey to test the threshold models
We devised two clinical scenarios - one for a familiar con-
dition and a second which required specialized knowledge.
Scenario 1 was about treatment of pulmonary embolism
(PE), which should be familiar to the vast majority of
physicians. Scenario 2 was about treatment of acute
myeloid leukemia (AML), with which only a minority of
physicians have experience (see Additional file 2 for the
survey/concrete examples).
To examine dual processing aspects, we used a variation
of the two-response paradigm in which initial responses
are considered to represent mostly type 1 processes,
and later responses are considered to represent the
added influence of type 2 processes. We, therefore, in-
cluded more detailed information between the first
and the second response.
To capture this initial (type 1) response, we first asked
all participants to provide their best assessment on bene-
fits/harms for treatment of PE and AML, respectively.
That is, the first question was devoid of any case-specific
contextual details. This response to benefits (B) and
harms (H) due to over-learned processes (see below and
Discussion) is postulated to be automatic (aut), and we
label them here as Baut and Haut.
The Baut over Haut is stipulated to serve as an “anchor”
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pAML relapse=50%; H2=24%; B2/H2=0.5
PE case (high risk of bleeding)
pPE=50%; H2=10%; B2/H2=1
PE case (low risk of bleeding)
pPE=50%; H2=1%; B2/H2=10
AML case (high risk of relapse)
pAML relapse=75%; H2=36%; B2/H2=0.33
AML case (low risk of relapse)
pAML relapse=33%; H2=6%; B2/H2=2
Figure 1 A schema of the experimental design. Note that design was entirely within participants and that all participants answered all
question (but in different order, according to the randomization sequence). Abbreviations: PE, Pulmonary embolism; AML, Acute Myeloid
Leukemia; Baut/Haut, automatic benefit to harm ratio; pPE, probability of PE, H2, harms associated with treatment provided; B2/H2, benefit to harm
ratio provided in the case; B1/H1, benefit to harm ratio elicited form participants using DVAS; Dvas, dual visual analog scale; pAML, probability of
AML relapse. Note: All participants completed all vignettes. Only the order of presentation of vignettes was randomized where indicated.
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various type 1 and type 2 processes. By eliciting the an-
chor value, our attempt was to ensure elicitation of the
subsequent responses related to B1 and H1 estimates
within clinically realistic range. Note, however, we only
need to elicit B1 and H1 values to perform the actual
calculations; elicitation of Baut and Haut only serve to
conduct the experimental procedure according to our
theoretical framework.
We note that type 1 processes are determined by a
number of factors, including: (a) affect, (b) evolutionary
hard-wired processes, responsible for automatic responses
to potential danger, (c) over-learned processes based on
type 2 mechanisms that have been relegated to type 1 re-
sponses (such as the effect of intensive training resulting
in the use of heuristics), and (d) the effects of tacit learn-
ing [11]. All these factors were taken into account in con-
struction of the vignettes in the following way: medical
education and exams typically consist of case vignettes,which after many hours of training become internalized
and represent the basis for acquiring expertise and actual
practice of medicine. The vignettes, therefore, were con-
structed to be as realistic as possible in order to represent
actual patients with additional context-specific details.
Thus, the response to the case integrates automatic type 1
processes to capture both the effect of intensive training
(which relies on the use of heuristics) and affect (regret)
to possible acts of omission or commission associated
with potentially wrong treatment. The latter was measured
using DVAS for assessment of regret in holistic fashion [25]
(See also Additional file 1). That is, the regret-related con-
sequences had encompassed all possible harms and benefits
envisioned by the respondents. Therefore, we label actually
elicited benefits and harms as B1 and H1.
To activate type 2 deliberations and analytic processes,
we provided additional objective data on the manage-
ment of PE and AML based on the best available evi-
dence in the literature. This was given both in terms
Table 1 Participant demographics and experience










Emergency Medicine 1 (2)
Family Medicine 10 (24)
Hematology and Oncology 14 (34)
Internal Medicine 5 (12)









Experience treating patients for PE (N = 41)
None 3 (7)
Fewer than 5 patients 11 (27)
Between 5 and 10 patients 4 (10)
Between 11 and 20 patients 7 (17)
More than 20 patients 16 (39)
PE vignettes similar to experience (N = 38)
Yes 30 (79)
No 8 (21)
Experience treating patients for AML (N = 41)
None 25 (61)
Fewer than 5 patients 4 (10)
Between 5 and 10 patients 1 (2)
Between 11 and 20 patients 4 (10)
More than 20 patients 7 (17)
AML vignettes similar to experience (N = 16)
Yes 14 (88)
No 2 (12)
Understand formal principles of decision
analysis (N = 41)
Yes 29 (71)
No 12 (29)
*One public health and one preparing for residency in internal medicine.
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and AML and specific prescriptive statements that
“treatment is justified when probability of disease (PE
or AML) is sufficiently high for given benefits and
harms”. We label the objective benefits and harms as
B2 and H2, respectively.
To keep the scenarios as realistic as possible, benefit and
harms parameters were tailored to the case descriptions
(PE, AML). Benefits and harms were given for each case
(6 vignettes in total). Three vignettes included description
of PE and three described AML cases. The three vignettes
represented the base-case (intermediate benefits/harms
ratio), high-risk (with low benefit/harms ratio resulting
in higher threshold in comparison with the base-case),
and low-risk (high benefit/harms ratio resulting in lower
threshold in comparison with the base-case). In the vi-
gnettes, we also provided data on probability of disease
(PE or AML relapse, respectively). In addition, when asked
“would you give treatment to this patient” in the instruc-
tion prior to presenting the first (base-case) vignette, we
included a normative statement that “treatment should
be given if probability of disease exceeds probability X”
where X was derived using B2/H2 data and referred to
the probability of PE and AML, respectively. In PE vi-
gnettes, in addition to providing assessment of probability
of disease in a base-case vignette, we also included data
on the probability of PE in high- and low-risk vignettes
(we kept probability of PE in all scenarios at 50%). The
intent was to enable type 2 functioning to the maximum
possible extent, and to ensure that the observed results
are not ascribed to simple error in calculations but ra-
ther reflect activation of systematic cognitive processes
(see also below). In case of AML, we provided sufficient
details from which a physician familiar with treatment
of AML could easily deduce high or low probability of
relapse (but without including explicit quantitative state-
ments about probability of AML relapse). The intent here
was to simulate actual practice where experts typically talk
about “high” or “low” risk for relapse, but rarely quantify
it. In both cases, we expected to observe the physicians’
behavior according to a threshold model.
Finally, to control for the order of presentation, we
randomly presented PE versus AML vignettes. We further
randomized the order of presentation to low versus high
“threshold” descriptions, and the DVAS anchor used to
elicit regret (i.e. we randomized a default slider position
at 0% vs. 100%). Thus, all participants were presented all
questions related to all vignettes, but the ordering of ques-
tions was randomized within the individual participants.
In summary, the manipulated factors were: response stage
(initial/final), scenario familiarity (pulmonary embolism/
acute myeloid leukemia), and level of threshold (“risk”)
according to EUT (high/low B2/H2 ratio), all manipulated
within participants.
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Statistical analysis
We planned to recruit 40 participants, which is a customary
sample size for cognitive psychology experiments. To
test our main hypothesis, we postulated the following:
if the threshold concept operates, then fewer physicians will
give treatment as the threshold probability increases; this is
because the physicians will require higher diagnostic cer-
tainty to prescribe treatments when threshold level is high.
Conversely, as the threshold drops, lower diagnostic cer-
tainty is required, and more physicians will prescribe treat-
ment. To assess whether our predictions will bear out, we
compared responses to the base-case vignettes with those
in which the threshold was higher (“high-risk”, low B2/H2)
or lower (“low-risk”, high B2/H2) in relation to the base-case
scenario. Thus, the main outcome in our study was com-
parison of a proportion of the physicians who will or will
not prescribe treatment in relation to perceived change in
the EUT threshold probability. To assess for the difference
in responses between base-case and high-risk (low B2/H2,
high threshold) and base-case and low-risk (high B2/H2, low
threshold) scenarios we employed McNemar’s test because
of the paired nature of our data [30].
Our secondary outcomes consisted of deriving three
thresholds, one for each model (i.e., TEUT, TRG and TDP)
with respect to the given probability of diagnosis of PE and
AML relapse, respectively. We postulated that the actual
threshold would be lower than the estimated probability of
disease for physicians who decided to treat. On the other
hand, for physicians who decided not to treat, the threshold
will be higher than the estimated probability of disease.
We computed the threshold for each participant and
assessed whether their decisions to treat or not were in
agreement with the particular threshold model. To ex-
plain which threshold model can best explain our main
results, we assessed the difference in agreement between
all three threshold models. Agreement was established if
the probability of PE or AML was greater than or equal
to threshold and the participant decided to treat or if
the probability of PE or AML was less than threshold and
the participant decided not to treat. A two-level logit
mixed-model was applied which allowed us to account for
the correlated multiple responses within each participant
for each of the six vignettes. The model was fit using the
command meqrlogit in STATA [31].
Results
A total of 41 consecutively enrolled physicians participated
in the web-based survey. Two out of 41 participants were
not practicing physicians (1 was a public health professional,
and 1 was preparing for residency in internal medicine).
Data from these two participants were included in the
report as there were no significant differences in thefindings when they were removed from the analysis. To
ensure that we enrolled a sufficient number of physicians
with experience in treating AML, an invitation to partici-
pate was first sent to hematology and oncology fellows and
the faculty at the USF. After receiving 10 responses, we sent
invitations for the survey to all other types of specialties.
Details on the demographics of participants and other
characteristics are summarized in Table 1. Thirty-eight
of the 41 participants (93%) had experience treating
PE, while 16 (39%) of physicians had experience with
treatment of patients with AML. Both PE and AML
vignettes were judged by majority of physicians (79%
and 88%, respectively) as realistic examples of real-life
clinical situations. Twenty-nine (71%) participants stated
that they are familiar with the formal principles of decision
analysis (which is based on EUT).
Table 2 shows the results of main analysis. The results
are consistent with our main hypothesis: fewer physicians
treat as the benefit/harms ratio decreased (i.e. threshold
increased) whereas more physicians administered treatment
as the benefit/harms ratio went up (and the threshold
decreased). A significantly lower proportion of physicians
favored treatment in the “high threshold” (high-risk) case
compared to the base-case both for PE and AML case vi-
gnettes (p < 0.0001). Similarly, a significantly higher propor-
tion of physicians favored treatment in the “low threshold”
(low-risk) case compared to the base-case (p < 0.0001)
in the AML vignette. However, there were no statisti-
cally significant differences in responses between the
base-case and “low threshold” case for PE. The reason
for this is that, surprisingly, we detected ceiling effects
in the PE case: all physicians stated that they would
treat the patient in the vignette with high benefit/harm
ratio (“low-risk”, “low threshold” vignette) while only one
physician would not treat the patient in the base-case vi-
gnette. Nevertheless, qualitatively the results went in the
same direction providing overall support for our hypoth-
eses. In addition, the results were robust to the sensitivity
analyses according to the years of experience, areas of
expertise, familiarities with the clinical situation, experi-
ence with decision analysis, or order of randomization
(see sensitivity analysis in Table two in Additional file 1).
Thus, the findings indicate that, relative to base rates, the
probability of treatment decreased in the “high threshold”
(“high-risk”, low benefit/harm ratio) vignettes, and in-
creased in the “low threshold” (“low-risk”, high benefit/
harm ratio) vignettes (except for PE where treatment
probability was at ceiling in the base-case and could
not increase any further).
The results show that the threshold concept is likely to be
operating in clinical practice but does not clarify which
threshold model is valid (Table 2). Table 3 shows the thresh-
old value results according to all three threshold models
tested (Additional file 2). When compared to the actual
Table 2 Decision to administer treatment (N = 41)
Pulmonary Embolism Acute Myeloid Leukemia
Case Treat (%) No treat (%) p-value Treat (%) No treat (%) p-value
Base case 40 (98) 1 (2) 27 (66) 14 (34)
High threshold (“risk”) case 16 (39) 25 (61) <0.0001 8 (20) 33 (80) <0.0001
Low (“risk”) threshold case 41 (100) 0 (0) 1 36 (88) 5 (12) 0.012
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lysis, we found that the regret model was marginally statis-
tically superior to the EUT model [Odds ratio (OR) = 1.49;
95% confidence interval (CI) 1.00 to 2.23; p = 0.06]. The
dual-processing model was statistically significantly super-
ior to both the EUT model [OR = 1.75, 95% CI 1.67 to
4.08; p < 0.001] and regret model [OR = 2.61, 95% CI 1.11
to 2.77; p = 0.018]. Figure 2 shows predicted probability of
the agreeing with threshold for each model. Thus, the
dual-processing threshold model appears to most consist-
ently agree with the observed data.
Discussion
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence that physicians
appear to make their decisions according to the threshold
model. A few empirical studies evaluated if physicians make
decisions according to the threshold model [18,19] but
none consider putting their results within a specific theor-
etical framework such as regret or dual processing theories.
In this paper, we evaluated three types of threshold models
published in the literature so far: 1) EUT [2], 2) regret [3,4],
and 3) dual-processing model [6].
Regardless which threshold model can explain physicians’
treatment decisions best, our finding that the thresholdTable 3 Physicians whose decision to administer treatment w
Pulmonary Embolism







EUT 40 (98) 1 (2) 1
Regret 38 (93) 3 (7) 0.625 0.62
Dual 40 (98) 1 (2)
High risk case
EUT 16 (39) 25 (61) 0.00
Regret 31 (76) 10 (24) 0.003 1
Dual 30 (73) 11 (27)
Low risk case
EUT 41 (100) 0 (0) <0.0
Regret 37 (90) 4 (10) 0.125 0.11
Dual 30 (73) 11 (27)
Note: Agreement was established if the probability of PE or AML was greater than o
PE or AML was less than threshold and the participant decided not to treat.model appears to underpin typical clinical decision-making
has practical implications for the practice of medicine
and medical education. For example, it is estimated that
between 30-50% of health care represents waste, mostly
due to over-treatment [32]. Furthermore, approximately
80% of all health care expenditures are attributed to
physicians’ decisions [33]. If physicians’ do act according to
the threshold model, this would mean that every time they
perceive that benefits of a treatment substantially outweigh
its harms, we can expect that the treatment threshold will
predictably drop. The lower the threshold, the lower is the
diagnostic certainty required to justify treatment, thereby
leading more physicians to prescribe treatment [5,20,21,34].
While this behavior may be rational, it, in turn, will lead to
increase in over-treatment [5]. For example, in the baseline
case of PE, almost all physicians (98%) would commit to
treatment even though probability of PE was only 50%; that
is, almost half of patients without PE would be treated un-
necessarily. Conversely, the requirement for higher diag-
nostic certainty may lead to under-treatment. For example,
in the high threshold case, only 39% of physicians would
give treatment, even though the probability of PE was
50% (Table 2). Thus, depending on the clinical circum-
stances, both under- and over-treatment do occur inas in agreement with specific threshold (N = 41)
Acute Myeloid Leukemia
regret






27 (66) 14 (34) 0.096
5 33 (80) 8 (20) 0.146 0.727
35 (85) 6 (15)
4 8 (20) 33 (80) <0.001
25 (61) 16 (39) <0.001 <0.001
40 (98) 1 (2)
01 36 (88) 5 (12) 0.453
8 23 (56) 18 (14) 0.011 0.021
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Figure 2 The predicted probability of the agreeing with threshold for each model. Dual processing model seems to fit the data best.
Table 4 Benefit versus harm ratio based on type 1 response*
Variable n Mean Min Median Max
PE Baut/Haut 40 4.33 .6 3.00 25.00
Base case B1/H1 40 6.28 0.75 3.18 49.50
Low risk B1/H1 39 12.46 0.66 5.26 100.00
High risk B1/H1 41 1.76 0.05 0.98 18.80
AML Baut/Haut 41 2.29 0.43 2.00 10.00
Base case B1/H1 41 1.55 0.00 1.00 7.07
Low risk B1/H1 39 4.39 0.00 1.94 22.50
High risk B1/H1 40 0.70 0.00 0.50 3.00
Abbreviations: Baut/Haut assessment of benefit/harms ratio based on automatic,
quick response, B1/H1-type 1 response driven by regret, PE pulmonary embolism,
AML acute myeloid leukemia, low “risk” low threshold, high “risk” high threshold
clinical decisions. [*Note that type 2 responses that relied on single values, fixed
B2/H2 ratios precluding direct statistical comparisons with Baut/Haut. However, the
values of B2/H2 differed considerably from Baut/Haut (from 1 to 10 in PE case, and
2 to 0.33 in AML case) consistent with a notion that the Baut/Haut estimates did
not solely drive the decision-making (see Discussion)].
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threshold model [4-6]. In general, however, over-treatment
dominates the current medical practice in the US [33,35].
Overall, the EUT model predicted the observations with
less accuracy compared to regret and dual-processing
based models. Although finding that people violate expected
utility theory is not new [8,20,21,36-38] it is, however, most
interesting that many physicians did not act according to
the EUT despite being given prescriptive advice indicating
that it may be the most rational approach and regardless of
the fact that the majority of them have been exposed to for-
mal principles of decision analysis. The participants satisfied
all the criteria for normative response: they had sufficient
cognitive ability, high motivation, and appropriate ‘mind-
ware’ i.e., cognitive tools to apply to the task [11], yet they
failed to do so. We are not aware of any literature where this
has been documented; in fact one lingering question related
to the literature about violation of EUT relates to the issue
whether the results can be explained by simple computa-
tional processing errors in the way people manipulate data
on outcomes and probabilities. Our findings show that it is
not simple processing errors that led to rejection of EUT.
Rather, the results point to the fundamental findings that
physicians, like other people [39], do not appear to follow
prescriptive EUTas the optimal decision-making framework
for medical decision-making. These observations have
implications for practice of medicine as influential organi-
zations charged to make clinical recommendations such as
the United States Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF)
have increasingly used modeling based on EUT to issue
clinical recommendations [40]. The fact that physicians
may fail to follow EUT as a basis for decision-making mayexplain, for example, the vociferous debate that accom-
panied publication of the USPSTF guidelines on screening
mammography [41].
We expected that much of the physicians’ actions are
driven by automatic type 1 processes further modified by
the contextual details of a given clinical situation. This is
the consequence of the way medical education is struc-
tured, as the overlearned processes from thousands of
hours of training eventually become one’s second nature
that serve as the basis for quick, automatic decisions. We
found that regret-based B1/H1 did differ from Baut/Haut
ratios across presented scenarios (Table 4). This, as
stipulated in the Methods, indicates that the contextual
characteristics of the cases presented in the vignettes
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(e.g., regret) and type 2 processes.
Our model has certain limitations. Although our data
do suggest physicians’ decision-making is more compat-
ible with dual processing model than with the EUT or a
simple regret model (Figure 2), our sample size was not
large enough to provide more conclusive support in
favor of dual processing model in each specific scenario
(Table 3). This was the main limitation of our study.
Nevertheless, theoretically, the results fit dual processing
theories well, because treatment of PE is familiar to most
physicians and AML is not. Novel problems trigger
type 2 processing; so, for the relatively unfamiliar AML
scenarios, dual processing (which takes both type 1 and
type 2 processes into account) has predictive advantage.
We should, of course, note that our results do not exclude
the possibility that some people do act according to either
EUT or regret model (Figure 2). In addition, as noted
earlier, there are many dual-processing theories [38] and
we evaluated a specific dual-processing model that is
applicable to single-point clinical decisions such as
those described in the vignettes [6] (see Additional file 1).
A different model and experimental design would be
needed for testing the way physicians make repeated
decisions.
Our results also hold promise in medical education.
We demonstrated that, at least in some circumstances,
physicians do act according to the threshold model.
Therefore, all medical curricula should include the teaching
the threshold model(s). Although, on average, dual
processing model has performed better, we believe that
all 3 models should be taught because they collectively
take into account the most salient features of human
decision-making (assessment of the likelihood of disease
and benefit/harms ratio), which are determined by both type
1 (fast, intuitive) and type 2 (slow, deliberative) reasoning
processes. In addition, as outlined above, these descriptive
models may conceivably be used in prescriptive fashion
under some circumstances. For example, in circumstances
where our affect plays a key role in the way we feel the
consequences of benefits and harms, we may rely on
regret approach. Conversely, where empirical evidence
on benefits and harms is a driver of decision-making,
then application of EUT may still be more suitable.
However, we suspect that integration of both approaches,
regret- and EUT-based, into dual processing model will
be useful to most users. The details of how this inte-
gration may work is beyond a scope of this paper, but
is sketched in [6].
Certainly, we need confirmatory and larger studies to
reproduce (or refute) our results. While we found that
the vignettes were judged by the vast majority of physi-
cians as realistic examples of real-life clinical cases, it is
still possible that different scenarios and different wordingmay elicit different responses. Although including realistic
and familiar scenarios can be deemed as one of the
strengths of our analysis, it has generated some analyt-
ical problems, as outlined above. Therefore, the future
research should include larger studies with relatively
less familiar, but still realistic-case vignettes.
Conclusions
We find that physicians appear to make treatment de-
cisions according to the threshold model. Furthermore,
physicians’ decision-making seems more compatible
with the dual processing model than with either EUT
or a simple regret model. While larger confirmatory
studies are needed to affirm our results, the findings of
this study may help improve our understanding of clin-
ical decision making under diagnostic uncertainty and
may be helpful in development of medical education
curricula and practice guidelines.
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